Η συκοφαντία είναι δικαίωμα ;-)

Διαβάζοντας το editorial γνωστής εφημερίδας με θέμα την ανωνυμία και την συκοφαντία είχα τις εξής σκέψεις:

- Δεν μου κάνει αίσθηση το επιχείρημα του στυλ "εμένα με κυνήγησαν, γιατί να μην μπορούν να κυνηγήσουν και εσάς" για τον ίδιο λόγο που δεν μου κάνει αίσθηση το "εγώ γιατί πήγα στρατό, κορόιδο ήμουν; Να πάνε και οι άλλοι". Κάτι που είναι λάθος δεν χρειάζεται να διαιωνίζεται επειδή κάποια άτομα μέχρι τώρα το έχουν υποστεί.

- Η ελευθερία του λόγου δεν έχει όρια.

Ρίχνοντας μια ματιά στο "The Ethics of Liberty" του Rothbard θυμήθηκα ότι εμείς οι libertarians θεωρούμε ότι όλα μας τα δικαιώματα πηγάζουν από την ιδιοκτησία του εαυτού μας (self-ownership) και άρα τα όρια της ελευθερίας του λόγου πρέπει να πηγάζουν από αυτό το αξίωμα. Έχει όρια λοιπόν και αυτά καθορίζονται από τα ιδιοκτησιακά δικαιώματα. (για τον ίδιο λόγο δεν πολυπιστεύω και στην πνευματική ιδιοκτησία)

Δεν θεωρώ ότι η συκοφαντία είναι κάτι καλό αλλά δεν παύει να είναι "δικαίωμα".

In short, should “libel” and “slander” be illegal in the free society?

And yet, once again, how can they be? Smith has a property right to the ideas or opinions in his own head; he also has a property right to print anything he wants and disseminate it. He has a property right to say that Jones is a “thief” even if he knows it to be false, and to print and sell that statement. The counter-view, and the current basis for holding libel and slander (especially of false statements) to be illegal is that every man has a “property right” in his own reputation, that Smith’s falsehoods damage that reputation, and that therefore Smith’s libels are invasions of Jones’s property right in his reputation and should be illegal. Yet, again, on closer analysis this is a fallacious view. For everyone, as we have stated, owns his own body; he has a property right in his own head and person. But since every man owns his own mind, he cannot therefore own the minds of anyone else. And yet Jones’s “reputation” is neither a physical entity nor is it something contained within or on his own person. Jones’s “reputation” is purely a function of the subjective attitudes and beliefs about him contained in the minds of other people. But since these are beliefs in the minds of others, Jones can in no way legitimately own or control them. Jones can have no property right in the beliefs and minds of other people.

Let us consider, in fact, the implications of believing in a property right in one’s “reputation.” Suppose that Brown has produced his mousetrap, and then Robinson comes out with a better one. The “reputation.” of Brown for excellence in mousetraps now declines sharply as consumers shift their attitudes and their purchases, and buy Robinson’s mousetrap instead. Can we not then say, on the principle of the “reputation” theory, that Robinson has injured the reputation of Brown, and can we not then outlaw Robinson from competing with Brown? If not, why not? Or should it be illegal for Robinson to advertise, and to tell the world that his mousetrap is better?

....

We can, of course, readily concede the gross immorality of spreading false libels about another person. But we must, nevertheless, maintain the legal right of anyone to do so.

Από το κεφάλαιο KNOWLEDGE, TRUE AND FALSE